The Indivisibility of Peace and the Role of South Africa as a Regional Power

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Collective security can work only if all members are dedicated to the national interest within the context of maintaining international peace and the indivisibility of peace. The UN needs to leverage the resources that express the member's international dimension of security interests that contributing to the idea of the indivisibility of peace. Necessary requirements include states having to develop common values around common security issues irrespective of their vital interests at stake. However, the universal acceptance of the indivisibility of peace has not always been matched by the commitment of states necessary to make the indivisibility of peace work— particularly in ongoing conflicts in Africa and the Middle east. With Western countries withdrawal from peacekeeping in Africa, South Africa assumes a rising leadership role in coordinating Africa's own resources on the principle of indivisibility of peace in Africa.

THE INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE

The idea that peace is indivisible has been influential in the theory and practice of security policies for hundreds of years. This has meant several things. The first is that peace and security are intimately linked. When states feel insecure, the steps they take to compensate for their perceived vulnerability often compromise the security of others and undermine the overall stability of the international system. The second is that the security of all states is undermined if aggression against any member is unchecked. The third is that no one state or group of states can combine the incentive, the capacity, and the moral authority to address the problems arising from the first two points. These three things combine to foster

the belief in the field of international relations that security is a community concern and peace is indivisible.

Following this, states, whatever their individual security concerns or interests, have to address them in a multilateral context. They have an over-riding interest in making contributions and sacrifices to express security as a community concern. That is, national security has to be addressed through international security.

This key idea had become virtually a consensus position in the discourse of security by the second half of the twentieth century. It is true that states differ on how they interpret the relationship between national and international security, but, by the end of the Second World War, none could ignore it. Despite this, the idea of indivisibility of peace has been cast in many forms and institutional expressions. Global and regional institutions have had military and non-military focuses. At this point it would be valuable to summarize some of the most important approaches to expressing and addressing the concerns which are driven from the convictions of the indivisibility of peace. This is because it has been interpreted in changing international (and now global) contexts as well as in light of changing ideas about the nature of international relations. Among other things, states' interpretation of the idea of the indivisibility of peace has been influenced by ideologies and conceptions of national interest and in light of fluctuating views and contradictory international contexts.

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This in turn illustrates that the idea of the indivisibility of peace is adaptive, developmental, and perhaps elusive in dimensions. This is to say that the belief in a multilateral dimension to peace and security issues in international relations and its development has always been incomplete and reflects a continuing uneasy blend of national and international security policies that threaten incoherence to the policy makers of both states and the multilateral institutions into which they form themselves. The changing institutional expressions of this belief focus on the development of peacekeeping as an increasingly subdivided doctrine at both global and regional levels. The changes and ramifications in multilateral security and order-keeping have in turn reflected altered material and ideological

conditions in global politics, which have been expressed in changing perceptions of the sources of threats to security and responses to them. In all of this however, the belief is constant that to one extent or another, peace is indivisible and that breaches of peace, whether caused by aggression or implosion, threaten more than the states directly involved.

In retrospect, the idea of the indivisibility of peace had become a virtually well-established position in the discourse of international security by the end of the First World War. States have reached a general agreement on the indivisibility of peace that some sort of international body has to be established to mobilize and pool the resources of sovereign states to administer and lead a multinational force against aggressors. This idea was put into effect by the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 and the United Nations (UN) in 1945. The League of Nations was created as the first comprehensive international collective security institution in the hope of averting global war after the disaster of WWI.

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The logic behind the formation of the League of Nations was to enforce collective security action to maintain international peace and order. However, the league could not perform its duties as set out in its covenant. The most important reason was a lack of genuine commitment on the side of its members to turn the text of the covenant into action against the lawbreakers and equally the United States isolationist policy at the time. Similarly, the UN has suffered from the dilution of members' commitment to the success of its objectives of maintaining international peace and security though under different conditions.

THE UN DESIGNED FOR THE WORLD OF THE 1930S

The UN could be described, with considerable justification, as a revised version of the League of Nations: Many of UN's features were indicative of conscious effort to avoid the deficiencies of the previous world organization,

especially in non-political fields, such as economic, social, legal matters and structural arrangements like General Assembly and the Secretariat but to strengthen the institutional system at points where weakness had become evident, and to project into the progressive future[1]. By 1945 Western, particularly American, conceptions of the theory and practice of international relations had become powerfully influenced by realist assumptions. The combined effect of these is to portray a world in which self-interest expressed in terms of power competition is the predominant motivating force in system of states characterized by decentralized authority and weak community structures.

UN institutions in the security field were built on two principles that grew out of this worldview. The first was that countervailing power organized by an executive committee of the world's strongest states into an overwhelming deterrent would be necessary to deal with the aggressor states that would be thrown up by the realist conditions of the international system. The second was the principle that such an executive committee would have to include all the world's greatest powers. Their status would have to be recognized with privileges to go with their responsibilities, and they would be able to act in their executive function only as long as their own vital interests—however they cared to define them—were not at stake. Out of these assumptions and principles, the Security Council, with its veto powers and (never to be realized) plans for permanent military forces at its disposal, was created.

> **UN security institutions were built on two principles. The first was that an executive committee with an overwhelming deterrent power would be necessary to deal with aggressor states. The second was the principle that such an executive committee would have to include the world's greatest powers.**

In this way, the collective security plans of the UN addressed the security problems of states by aspiring to mobilize and coordinate the capacities of the most powerful states for policing responsibilities. Their duties rested on the belief that they would regard the experience of the previous decade as incontrovertible evidence that the indivisibility of peace was a reality and quintessential to the security of all states

Nevertheless, although these institutional arrangements represented a conscious effort to replace the idealism of the league with a tougher stance on security issues, the UN's structures retained a considerable amount of the league's approach to reducing conflict through the peaceful resolution of disputes, disarmament, and preventive diplomacy. As with its predecessor, the UN assumed that a peaceful approach to security was that the political and diplomatic approach would at best actually ward off armed conflict and at worst clarify who the aggressor was and prepare the ground for punitive action.[2] Since its inception in 1945, the UN has been undertaking measures to maintain international peace and security under its political and military provisions. The Charter (Article 24) granted the Security Council the responsibility for utilizing every possible means to restore or maintain international peace. Among these are (1) seeking political, legal, and diplomatic solutions that involve peaceful resolution of disputes under chapter VI of the UN Charter, including activities such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation of the disputing parties; and (2) using forceful means of restoring peace under the authorization of chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allows both military and non-military actions, such as economic sanctions against a law breaker or aggressor in order to restore international peace. The post-WWII distribution of power and the UN Charter, which reflected it in so many ways (notably in the composition and powers of the Security Council), left the UN with collective security provisions that equipped it well to deal with the security problems of the 1930s. Under the UN's classic collective security provisions, a lone revisionist aggressor could be met with the combined weight of the international community represented by a concert of the greatest powers armed with legitimate military powers to persuade, deter, or punish it through a range of diplomatic, sanctioning, or military means.

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However, two related developments frustrated this vision of the indivisibility of peace through community action delegated to the most powerful states, in the belief that they alone could achieve genuine collective security. The first was the end of the wartime alliance on which the hopes of concert lay. Guided by fundamentally opposed views of international order and facing each other over the ruins of Europe, as well as in Asia where the colonial order had been shattered by the initial success and then the subsequent defeat of Japanese expansionism, the United States and the USSR could not form the basis of global order through a concert of the great powers that the UN Charter envisaged.

The ideological competition and rivalry between the superpowers blocked constructive developments of peacekeeping operations during the Cold War. The Security Council was forced to confine any peacekeeping mission to circumstances in which the peacekeeping agenda conformed to the national interest of the two superpowers or at least where they were both prepared to consent. Despite its

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mandate of maintaining international peace and security, which is set out in the first article of the UN Charter, the superpowers' competition for global influence and geo-strategic interest denied the Security Council the power to operate at full capacity irrespective of how serious the threat to the peace might be.

For instance, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was unwilling to contribute to the cost of the vast majority of UN peacekeeping operations that did not coincide with Soviet interests[3]. The United States had also substantially cut its dues to the UN.[4] Despite the fact that the end of the Cold War brought an end to Soviet ideology and despite the fact that the former superpowers agreed to work together over peacekeeping, a lasting solution to the fresh kind of intra-state conflict and total state collapse evidenced in some of the third world countries after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s could not necessarily be expected. However, at least the superpower dominance over the UN veto system to satisfy its own ideological interest and expand its sphere of influence no longer exists,

but still the dominance of the only superpower, the United States and the less certain influence of regional powers is very real. The location of responsibility for peace and security has been a contested issue among the UN Security Council, General Assembly, Secretary General, and regional bodies. Factors like the need to recognize the realities of power as well as the imperatives of efficient delivery and democratic accountability have been involved. These factors have always had to be seen in the context of political rivalries in international relations as well as on their own merits.

In the second place, this situation of rival social systems and undeclared hostilities spread by the growth of rival alliance systems attacked the practicality of the UN collective security system by undermining the core of community power on which the certainty of punishment for an aggressor rested. It also undermined the principle of collective security, which required a clear community consensus (a tenuous possibility at best) on the nature of aggression and the identification of the aggressor. Achieving lasting peace in the twentieth century had become increasingly complex and became extravagantly difficult to realize. For instance, some states in the Middle East existed in a semi-permanent condition of war and operated where Cold War allegiances combined with the revolutionary possibilities of decolonization and defined the consensual definition and identification of aggression and aggressor.

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To sum up, the UN equipped itself with collective security provisions that did not fit the post-1945 world in which they were supposed to operate. They needed a durable consensus that transcended particular political configurations of each conflict situation in order to make them work as envisaged. Neither in the Cold War era, nor even in the post-Cold War world, has this been forthcoming. What is more, the kind of aggression that the collective security system of the UN was designed to deter or punish has rarely been a feature of the conflicts of the past seventy years.

THE RISE OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS

The post-Cold War period has witnessed a greater prevalence of intra-state conflicts than ever before. The so-called failed states have emerged in the international system. At worst, bloody civil wars have caused the total disappearance of internationally recognized states. Clearly, the UN has struggled to settle conflicts within states. This means that throughout most of its history, whatever experience and success in resolving conflicts the UN has had has been with inter-state conflicts rather than intra-state. The UN attempts to restore failed states to their former shape and geographical picture seem hardly successful.

Some of UN's problems in dealing with the newly emerged security situation arise from its own nature. The UN was formed to create peaceful international relations among states, settle conflicts between them, and to undertake collective measures to deter the aggression that leads to global war, but the UN Charter itself has doctrinal constraints to deal with the new nature of conflict. Article 2(7) reads, "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."[5] UN. Hence, crises involving gross violation of human rights within states' jurisdiction have been largely ignored, as in the 1994 Rwanda genocide.

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The key to the UN's inadequacies for carrying out effective peacekeeping also rests on political and resource limitations. The traditional states' national interest-driven conduct of international relations has directly stood in the way of the UN global peacekeeping. Politically motivated interventions have also impinged on states' level of resource commitment towards the UN global missions. The UN veto power system, which is supposed to work in the interest of international security, has been manipulated to serve narrowly defined national interests.

In principle, collective security would work only if all members are fully dedicated to the achievements of national interest within the context of

maintaining international peace and indivisibility of peace. This demands that irrespective of their economic and military strength, every member country should be willing to participate under the authority of the UN. The UN needs to leverage contemporary instruments and resources that express the member's international dimension of security interests that illustrate the adaptive and developmental dimensions of the belief in the idea of the indivisibility of peace. Necessary requirements include states having to develop common values around common security issues on the principle of indivisibility of peace irrespective of their vital interests at stake. However, these are ambitious and far-reaching requirements. Like the spirit of the league collective security, the UN continues to deal with the inherent problem to harmonize with states' stubborn, perhaps inescapable tendency, to conceive themselves as sovereign and self-willed entities with their own national interests.

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Arguably, states have their reasons for seeing their world and their interests in the way they do. However, the states may differ on what peacekeeping institutions are for and how they should act, but no state of any standing or influence can afford to deny their legitimacy or refuse to participate in them. Therefore, states should not waver in their disposition to regard multilateral conceptions of security as indispensable. Nonetheless, each generation must reinvent practices and principles of collective security efforts according to global and regional context and historical circumstance to cope with the adaptive and developmental dimensions of the belief in the idea of the indivisibility of peace.

Since its inception, collective security is modest in its expression, representing somewhat ambivalent center of efforts to multilateral approach, not the threshold to a wider and fuller commitment to the indivisibility of peace. Throughout its history, the UN has struggled to give effect to these lofty ideas in a constantly changing political context. Among other things, constraints of additional values in international relations—notably that of national sovereignty and the constantly changing nature both of security

issues themselves and the distribution of power and influence in which they arise—call for constant evaluation of the theory and practices that give expression to the idea of collective security. This reaffirms that despite the idealistic hopes of theorists and some statesmen, what has emerged from the growing acceptance that there are community interests in peacekeeping and security is not a seamless developmental progression towards a genuine and universal security community. Perhaps the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the history of multilateral security efforts, especially those involving institutional mechanisms for the deployment of community peacekeeping force, is a cautionary one.

The dramatic changes in the nature of conflict, most of which are now intra-state, made it difficult to apply the United Nations restricted doctrines of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force during intervention in the aftermath of the Cold War. The post-Cold War period has witnessed the so-called complex emergencies where the state apparatus has totally collapsed and lawlessness has taken over as the result of vicious civil wars. The deadly civil wars, disease outbreaks and famine claimed the lives of thousands of millions as witnessed in Somalia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia, Sudan and most recently, in South Sudan, Libya, Yemen and Syria. This means that the UN Cold War doctrines of consent, impartiality, and minimum use of force became difficult to apply under the new circumstances no matter how well they had served in the past. It is difficult to secure consent and impartiality in the absence of legitimate government within failed states and when dozens of factions are involved in civil war. This means intervention has to be conducted in situations where conflict has not been terminated and consent has not been reached with the conflicting parties at the time of international deployment. This involves eroding the wall of traditional sovereignty in the absence of a functioning state and central government as a necessary thing to enforce peace, contain the disaster of the civil war on civilian populations, and make a way for humanitarian assistance. This

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means more coercive action should be taken against those who have broken agreements to spur on the dispute.[6]

THE NEED TO REVISE UN DOCTRINE ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Indeed, the legitimacy of the instigation of the mission derives from the authority of the UN and Security Council resolution and less from the consent of the conflicting parties.[7] Unlike the traditional peacekeeping practice where the peacekeepers are following a strategic agenda agreed to by the parties, the peacekeepers are now enforcing the UN Security Council mandates. Arguably, the legal base of post-Cold War peacekeeping action is potentially more fragile than a traditional peacekeeping operation because it is based on a less robust environment of consent and the initiatives stem more from international powers than from conflicting parties themselves.[8]

Considering such circumstances, the UN should not be bound by its principle of non-violability of the sovereignty of states as stated in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which reads "nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the international body to intervene in the matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." As Helman and Ramer point out, in the cases of failed states, the "traditional view of sovereignty has so decayed that all should recognize the appropriateness of the UN measures inside member states to save them from self-destruction."[9] In his General Assembly speech (1999), former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan strongly asserted that the UN should take responsibility to protect civilian victims of internal armed conflicts.[10]

> **Unlike the traditional peacekeeping practice where the peacekeepers are following a strategic agenda agreed to by the parties, the peacekeepers are now enforcing the UN Security Council mandates.**

Hence, the concept of responsibility to protect (RtoP) has been endorsed by the United Nations since 2005 to allow the UN to intervene to rescue civilians amid internal armed conflicts. In response, the UN has adopted a new mandate of greater use of military intervention

called "forceful humanitarian intervention," which is designed to limit the effects of a conflict and assist in creating the conditions for its termination and humanitarian aid and civilian protection.[11] NATO intervention in Lidiya could be considered as an example. Although the new model of intervention equally considers application of the issue of consent wherever possible, it places much less weight when the conflicting parties choose not to yield to their original terms of agreement. The new practice of UN peacekeeping requires the use of increasing force to protect civilian victims and to maintain its position in the event conflicting parties launch an attack against the UN force. Therefore, the RtoP should be further justified with doctrinal establishment as a new principle of intervention in the reformed UN structure.

The idea and practice of developing a greater military dimension under the new peacekeeping model has faced critical debate and opposition from the advocates of traditional limits to peacekeeping activities.

While flexibility over sovereignty may seem like a common sense approach to problems of humanitarian crisis and intervention in a world defined by powerful self-interested nations with political and economic agendas, it is all too easy to see the pressures that could be brought to bear on the UN in defining individual occasions when sovereignty may or may not be set aside. While the issue of sovereignty remains sensitive, one may argue that humanitarian-motivated intervention may face as much armed resistance and opposition from the conflicting parties as a peacekeeping force having political, economic, or geostrategic motives. For example, the U.S. intervention in Somalia in 1992 was largely humanitarian driven, but upon arrival of the U.S. forces, Somali warring factions stopped fighting each other and turned their attacks against the U.S. forces.

The idea and practice of developing a greater military dimension under the new peacekeeping model has faced critical debate and opposition from the advocates of traditional limits to peacekeeping activities. They argue that significant use of force has no place in UN actions because using force means losing consent, an essential requirement for keeping peace.26 They further claim that massive use of force in Somalia and Kosovo by the

American and by the UN brought no success but discredited both the UN and Americans.[12]

However, considering the limitations of traditional peacekeeping to handle massive civilian causalities and of new manifestation of conflicts, the need of more coercive UN peacekeeping is without doubt a necessary thing to do. The changing nature of international conflicts in the post-Cold War era, especially in Africa where there has been massive civilian murder (e.g., genocide in the case of Rwanda, Sudan and Syria). This further underscores the need for more coercive and forceful military intervention that employs modern and advanced weapons to undertake international peacekeeping.

The changing nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era has resulted in dramatic changes in peacekeeping concepts, conduct, and approaches. Among other things, the need for civilian component of peacekeepers such as doctors, nurses, social workers, and civilian police to work along the military component of peacekeepers to manage the complex humanitarian emergencies. In addition, numbers of regional and national institutions have participating in peacekeeping have increased enormously under post-cold war peacekeeping missions. Therefore, the number of role players in post-Cold War peacekeeping efforts has also significantly increased.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING

Regional bodies including the African Union (AU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and Southern African Development Community (SADC) have become prominent in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. For example, African Union conducted regional peacekeeping in Sudan,

Somalia, South Sudan and Burundi. ECOWAS conducted peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone. NATO conducted intervention is Libya. SADC in the DRC and Lesotho. Western powers also conducted peacekeeping on their own national account. The U.S. intervention in Somalia (1992), France in Ivory Coast (2001) and Mali, and Britain in Serra Leone (1999) provide examples of this.

Nonetheless, the involvement of a number of role players in post-Cold War intervention have inevitably evoked the problem of unclear mandate, command and control issues, and clashes of interest among stakeholders especially in connection with new tasks of the so-called humanitarian intervention, which were undertaken in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Such confusions led in all cases to the withdrawal of the interventionist force.

Regional organizations are more familiar with local and regional dynamics of conflicts and have sound knowledge of indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolutions. Therefore, regional organizations have had to share the UN burden of maintaining peace and security.

In the former Yugoslavia, NATO exceeded the political-legal authority granted to it by the UN. SADC intervened in the 1998 Lesotho crisis without the authorization and control of the UN Security Council. The UN secretary-general reported that, while the undertaking of parallel operations by ECOWAS and the UN in Liberia broke fresh ground in peacekeeping, finding a joint concept of operation was not easy. Each one of the role players has its own principles of peacekeeping and agenda for involvement. In some cases it was not clear what the missions of the peacekeepers—whether to restore peace or to deliver humanitarian assistance. Needless to say that the confusions surrounding the mandate of modern peacekeeping make peacekeeping missions far from smooth. These are clear indications of possible tension between the UN and regional bodies.

Needless to say that regional organizations are more familiar with local and regional dynamics of conflicts and have sound knowledge of indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolutions. Therefore, regional organizations would have to share the UN burden of maintaining peace and security in their respective regions. Regional organizations have growing aspirations to play

an active role in conflict resolution in their respective regions in order to ward off the most immediate "collateral damage" from regional conflicts. Fourth, regional involvement is characterized as less costly, quick intervention, and easy access to the conflict zone due to geographical proximity and in some cases knowledge of common language and culture.

However, casting greater peacekeeping and conflict resolution responsibility on regional organizations may bear the following problems. First, regional states are technically unable to carry out extended peacekeeping missions because of a lack of finances, low levels of skills and professionalism, and poorly equipped peacekeeping personnel. Second, regional organizations are often accused of a lack of impartiality for representing the national prejudices of their most powerful member(s) of the regional organization. This problem of a lack of impartiality arises from covert and overt political objectives of regional powers. In this respect, forces from distant countries are highly recommended. Third, regional organizations' role can be weakened by the lack of a formal mandate and policy framework and by less experience to handle security issues in their respective geographical areas.

However, regional organizations may have less technical skill and financial capabilities. They also might lack impartiality in regional conflicts. They also may lack a formal international mandate.

However, despite the fact that regional organizations are required to seek prior approval from the UN, they have not always been consistent with the UN standard procedure of regional intervention. For example, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) conducted intervention in Lesotho in 1998 without the authorization of the UN.[13] The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was accused of using excessive force during peace-keeping operation in Kosovo.[14] These problems arise from each regional organization having its own principle and agenda for intervention that led to possible tension with the UN.

Nonetheless, the potential for regional organizations in peacekeeping and conflict resolutions can't be ignored because of a number of reasons. First, past experiences have proved that the UN has limited resource to

resolve widespread international conflicts by itself. Africa has particularly been a serious testing ground for UN international peacekeeping missions. Failures in Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Angola (1999), and Sierra Leone (2000) and most recently, its ongoing struggle in the Middle East and Africa are clear indications of the UN's inadequacy to address peace and conflict issues in those regions.

The UN suffered three fundamental problems to deal with intrastate conflicts. The first is doctrinal limitation. The UN was formed to create peaceful international relations among states and to settle con-flicts between them but refrains itself from dealing with conflict within states no matter how destructive the conflict might be. Article 2(7) of the UN Charter clearly specifies that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." This means that the UN suffers from constraints of its own doctrine of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs of member states. Under such circumstance, the UN lacks proper doctrinal arrangements to address armed conflicts within sover-eign states. The existing doctrinal flaw has raised critical issue of whether the actions of the UN in sovereign states are within legitimate doctrinal limits.

> It is imperative that the UN takes critical steps to undertake revisions on its principles of non-interference and respect for traditional sovereignty. Instead, it should establish a framework of intervention that authorizes it with the responsibility to protect under circumstances in which civilians are purposely targeted by internal armed conflicts.

Therefore, it is highly imperative that the UN takes critical steps of undertaking doctrinal revisions on its long-standing principles of non-interface and respect for traditional sovereignty. Instead, the UN should look to establish a doctrinal framework of intervention that authorizes it with the responsibility to protect under circumstances in which civilians are purposely targeted by internal armed conflicts.

Helman and Ramer point out that the traditional view of sovereignty has so decayed that all should recognize the appropriateness of the UN

measures inside member states to save them from self-destruction.[15] In his General Assembly speech (1999), former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan strongly asserted that the UN should take responsibility to protect civilian victims of internal armed conflicts.[16] However, part of empowering the UN should involve doctrinal revision of the longstanding principle of non-intervention to allow the UN to intervene to rescue civilians amid internal armed conflicts. This takes as its main purpose protecting civilian victims of the ongoing armed conflict by creating a safety zone against human rights abuse. For example, during the Gulf war, the Kurds were protected by the allied forces from attacks by Iraqi forces. The mission also involved providing them with humanitarian assistance (e.g., food and medicine). The mission used military means to sustain relief efforts, as did the one in Somalia. Arguably this constitutes a sweeping revision of the original concept of "security," which is underpinned in UN Charter Article 2(7) and which effectively outlaws intervention in the internal affairs of member states.

> **As a region, Africa ranks at the lowest place in the Western foreign policy priorities. Its lack of geostrategic significance and its less than five percent contribution to the global economy have relegated it to the backburner.**

The UN collective security mandates have been significantly impaired by traditional states' national interest-driven conduct of international relations. For example, the Western powers have no political interest to commit the necessary military and financial resources to UN interventions in regions where they have no immediate geostrategic and economic interest, particularly in Africa. Without doubt, the West's erroneous security policy towards Africa has significantly hurt the UN-led multilateral security efforts in Africa. Under such condition, the UN has no other option but depend on African regional organizations to seek solutions to peace and security problems in their continent. As a region, Africa ranks at the lowest place in the Western foreign policy priorities. Africa's obvious lack of geostrategic significance in the aftermath of the Cold War and its less than five percent contribution to the global economy have relegated it to the back burner of Western powers' foreign policy priorities. This means that the universal acceptance of the indivisibility

of peace has not always been matched by the commitment of the resolve and resources that are necessary to make the belief in the indivisibility of peace work—particularly in African situations. Arguably, the Western commitment to their strategic national interest outweighs their obligation to the UN collective security system has to be viewed from the standpoint of their commitment to the indivisibility of peace. The unconditional military disengagement of Western states from African conflict has in many cases left no other option for a strong African state such as South Africa other than involving itself in African conflicts.

SOUTH AFRICA AS A REGIONAL PEACEKEEPER

Several factors help to shape South African policy in the area of peace-keeping on the continent of Africa. So far, four of them stand out. First, there has been a general tendency on the part of outsiders, especially the western countries and African states to accept South Africa's role in order-keeping of failed African states within the universally accepted frameworks of international and African regional institutions. The Western countries' expectations of South Africa taking the leadership role in conflict resolution in Africa rests on a number of elements. Some believe that South Africa's own peaceful transition from pariah state to democracy and the steady improvement of its internal political conditions (e.g., democratization, good governance, and human rights) in post-Apartheid time have encouraged Western countries to see South Africa as a beacon of democracy. Others argue that the South African National Defense Force (SANDF) is the only military force in Sub-Saharan Africa with the logistical and technical capacity to sustain a large peacekeeping intervention.[17] Some others are of the view that with its infrastructure, strategic location, and

Some see South Africa's own peaceful transition from pariah state to democracy as providing cultural elements for peacekeeping. Others argue that the South Africa has the only military force with the capacity for a large peacekeeping intervention. Still others see its infrastructure and relatively strong economy, as necessary in financing extended peacekeeping on the continent.

relatively strong economy, South Africa could play a vital role in financing extended peacekeeping in the continent.[18]

Secondly, upon its re-admission to the international system, the post-Apartheid South African foreign policy makes themselves have immediately grappled with the regional and national security imperatives. South Africa did not have much of a choice of an either/or basis between national and regional security dimensions in its attempts to make itself safe in an uncertain and always changing regional and international security context. Obviously, the international security dimension leans towards the indivisibility of peace as a guiding principle. However, South Africa's national security perspective wishes to limit commitments and calculate interests when this principle has to be put into practice. Not only must South African policy makers cope with this tension in their own policies, but they are also subject to its effects in the policies of others, especially the Western states and South Africa's neighbors on the African continent.

> **It is in South Africa's national interest to see Africa stable and at peace. South Africa wishes to create a safe environment for regional reconstruction and development and to ward off the perceptions of investors and traders of the contagion effect from regional instability.**

Thirdly, South Africa's own aspirations to play leadership roles in African security within multilateral organizations, especially the UN and African Union. It is in South Africa's national interest to see Africa stable and at peace. South Africa wishes to create a safe environment for regional reconstruction and development and to ward off the perceptions of investors and traders of the contagion effect from regional instability. If future stability and security depends on sustainable economic growth, then all African states have an incentive to regard the peace of Africa as indivisible and to make the contributions and sacrifices that classically multilateral security policies require.

Fourthly, the condition of the African continent itself shaped South Africa's role in peacekeeping in the continent. Africa is a continent of failing states and weak institutions. It is also a context in which emergency and crisis management are regrettably frequent. Here South Africa has

three advantages. The first is acceptance by the industrialized countries as a potential focal point for continental re-generation. The second is its comparatively high level of development in relation to many other African states. However, these areas of strength are contradicted by the danger in other Africans' eyes of appearing to be a Western surrogate or even to have imperialist designs of its own as well as self-doubt, a sense of its own limitations, and fears of over-commitment. The third advantage is economic relations between South Africa and most other African countries (with the partial exception of the oil producing countries) are likely to be strikingly asymmetrical, at least in the short term. This may be a source of satisfaction in terms of South Africa's overall balance of trade and its claim to be the gateway to the African continent. However, it gives rise to resentments and fears of South African hegemony on the part of virtually all other African countries.[19] These resentments and fears complicate South Africa's diplomatic and economic relations with the rest of the continent.

> **South Africa is prepared to commit to the maintenance of global peace and stability by participating in ensuring regional peace, stability, and development within the framework of the UN and regional bodies, OAU/AU, and SADC.**

However, South Africa's own commitment to the security of Africa raises two dilemmas. First is the extent of Africa's problems that a considerable investment of resources is required to make progress in solving them. From the question of indebtedness, to good governance and conflict resolution and peacekeeping, the tasks are daunting and open-ended. South Africa and the Western states have tended to match each other in reluctance to commit real resources. Second is that, while it is essential that South Africa identifies closely with Africa in its present problems and future potential, there is a danger of the contagion effect, which classifies South Africa as a bad risk along with Africa's more serious cases of conflict and bad governance. South African policy makers have to emphasize that South Africa is an African state but not a typical African state.

Nonetheless, since the advent of multi-racial democracy in South Africa in 1994, South Africa has been developing a fairly robust involvement in conflict resolution in Africa both at policy and practical levels. At policy

level, South Africa has formulated its policy on international missions as is codified in its white paper on international peace. The White Paper states that South Africa is prepared to commit itself towards the maintenance of global peace and stability by participating in the process of ensuring regional peace, stability, and development within the framework of the UN and regional bodies, OAU/AU, and SADC where applicable and also subject to agreement with the host country, the conflicting par-ties, and contrib-uting countries. At practical level, South Africa enhanced its diplomatic and military involvement, both unilaterally and within the framework of the AU in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho, the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict, and in Madagascar; these can be singled out as examples showing that South Africa has made quite encouraging progress in conflict resolution on the continent.

However, despite some gestures mentioned above, South Africa's position has been on the conservative side due to pressing internal socio-economic issues. South Africa's policy makers have been engaged in internal debate on how much the country can afford to invest in conflict resolu-tion in Africa and how the load should be shared with other regional and international actors as it is becoming more expensive business.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Perhaps the most striking conclusion to be drawn from the history of mul-tilateral security efforts- especially those involving institutional mechanism for the deployment of the community force – is a cautionary one. Despite the idealistic hopes of theorists and some statesmen, what has emerged from growing acceptance that there are community interests in order keeping and security is not a seamless developmental progression towards genuine, universal security community. Instead, each generation reinvents practices and principles according to global and regional context and historical cir-cumstances, to cope with the by now irreversible conclusion that peace is indivisible. South African policy- makers are well aware of the imperative of matching their understanding of the need for multilateral approaches to security perhaps under the re-formed UN system and within developing security architecture of the African Union.

Arguably, South Africa is better able militarily and financially to lead and sustain peace support operation in Africa than any other African countries.

But South Africa certainly needs to learn from the experiences of other African countries such as Nigeria and Ghana which have sound records of involvement in regional and international peacekeeping missions. Nigeria especially, as a leader of ECOWAS peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has a lot to offer South Africa pertaining to leadership role in African regional peacekeeping operations.

NOTES

1. Inis L. Claude Jr., *Power and International Relations,* New York: Random House, 1962, pp.60 61

2. Michael Roskin and Nicholas Berry, *The New World of International Relations,* Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1977, p. 354.

3. Kurt Campbell and Thomas Weiss, "Superpowers and UN Peace-keeping," *Harvard International Review* 12, no. 2 1990, p. 23.

4. Anap Shah. "US and Foreign Aid Assistance," *Christian Science Monitor,* April 13, 1999, p. 7.

5. UN Charter, Article 2(7).

6. Christopher Dandeker et al., "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 3,1997, pp. 24-25.

7. Ibid, p. 29

8. Ibid, pp. 29-30.

9. Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 3.1995, P. 392.

10. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan Speech to the General Assembly, 1999

11. Dandeker and others "The Future of Peace Support Operations" p. 25.

12. Ibid, p. 22

13. Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ob-server Missions in Liberia, S/1995/473 United Nations, New York, 10 June

14. Ibid.

15. Dandeker, Christopher and Gow, James "The Future of Peace Support Operations" *Armed Forces and Society* 3, 1997, pp. 29-30.

16. Eva Bertram, "Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building" *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 1995, p. 392.

17. South Africa's long-developed nuclear capacity provided the white minority government with six nuclear bombs. Each of these bombs contains a capacity and strength of force twice the size of the atomic bombs used by the United States to destroy Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the WWII.

18. "European Round of Honour," *Republic of South Africa Review* 3, no. 6 (June/July 1990).

19. David Simon, ed., *South Africa in Southern Africa: Reconfiguring the Re-gion* (London: Longman, 1998).